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COMMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS IN NORTH DAKOTA
INTRODUCTION

Administrative Law is more and more becoming an important factor in the practice of law. Recently the President
signed into law a new Federal Administrative Procedure Act.,
In 1941 our own Legislature enacted the Administrative
Agencies Uniform Practice Act, which in the words of the
statute "... . shall apply to all claims and proceedings filed in
or commenced by an administrative agency subsequent to July

1, 1941."

2

The scope of this article is not to review the procedure set
out in the Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act but
to trace the scope of judicial review given to administrative
decisions and to show the effect of the new Act upon such
review. A brief comparison of the North Dakota system and
the Federal system will also be undertaken.
GENERAL RULES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

As a general rule, the Administrative Agency's finding of
fact is conclusive upon a reviewing court and not open to
judicial review if supported by evidence, or substantial
evidence.3 The reason for this is usually stated as being because
the Agency is suppose to possess the special knowledge and
expertiess that is required to pass upon such questions. On
the other hand, as to questions of law, the court may substitute its own judgment for that of the Agency. In doing this,
however, the Agency's decision on points of law is nevertheless persuasive and given weight.
Stat. 237
Section 28-3222, N. D. Rev. Code 1943.
3 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197,
83 L. Ed. 126, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)
4 State v. Great Northern R. Co., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N. W. 247, Ann. Cas.
1917B 1201 (1915); In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
et al, 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947) our Supreme Court has now taken a stand that
when a new principle has been announced by an administrative agency, if based
upon substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority granted by
Congress, it is not open to change by the courts. A strong dissent in this case
feels that the court is allowing the administrative agency to decide questions of
law.
1 60

2
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The U. S., Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence
as follows: " 'Substantial Evidence' is more than a mere
scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 5
REVIEW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
CASES IN NORTH DAKOTA

The Workmen's Compensation Act when first enacted provided that, "The Bureau shall have full power and authority
to hear and determine all questions within its -jurisdiction,
and its decision shall be final." The Act then proceeded to
give the claimant a right of appeal to the District Court where
he was entitled to a "... . trial in the ordinary way." 6 This
provision was construed in Gotchy v. N. D. Workmen's Compensation Bureau.7 The parties had stipulated that the case
should be tried without a jury, in the District Court, under
the so-called Newman Act.8 When the case was before the
Supreme Court, the court stated, "Accordingly we are of the
opinion that this appeal is a special proceeding pursuant to
the Compensation Act; that it is not triable de novo upon
appeal to this court. The findings of the trial court, therefore,
are presumed to be correct unless clearly opposed to the
preponderance of the evidence." In this case, therefore, the
Supreme Court definitely stated that an appeal from the
Workmen's Compensation Bureau was not a case that could be
tried under the Newman, Act, and could not be reviewed de
novo in the Supreme Court but was a special statutory proceeding. The review then given by the Supreme Court, after
the appellant has had a "trial in the ordinary way" is not a
review anew, but the findings of the trial court are presumed
to be correct unless clearly opposed to the preponderance of
the evidence.9
5

Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra.

6 Laws of 1919 Chapter 162; Section 17
7

49 N. D. 915, 194 N. W. 663 (1923)

8 Laws of 1919 Chapter 8; This act provides for appeals in cases tried by

the court without a jury. Among other things, this statute allows appellant to
obtain a.review of the entire case by the Supreme Court, if he so requests such
an extensive review.
9 Gotchy v. N. D. Workmen's Compensation Bureau is cited with approval
in the following cases: Altman v. N. D. Workman's Compensation Bureau, 50
N. D. 215, 195 N. W. 287, 28 A. L. R. 1337 (1923); Dehn v. Kitchen, 54 N. D.
199, 209 N. W. 364 (1926); Klemmens v. Workman's Compensation Bureau, 54
N. D. '496, 209 N. W. 972 (1926); Pfeiffer.v. N. D. Workman's Compensation
Bureau, 57 N. D. 326, 221 N. W. 894 (1928).
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In 1935 our Legislature amended Sec. 17 of Chapter 162 of
the Laws of 1919 to the effect that on appeal to the Supreme
Court, the appellant is entitled to a trial de novo.10 This was
allowed in Weisgerber v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau.
At this point then, the appellant is entitled to a "trial in the
ordinary way" in the District 'Court, and a trial de novo in
the Supreme Court.
In 1941 the Legislature enacted the Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act. 12 In Schmidt v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau,1 3 the court ruled that the plaintiff could
not begin a separate and distinct action in the District Court
but must first present his claim to the Bureau. The court held
that the jurisdiction of the District Court was appellate only.
This undoubtedly means that although the plaintiff is entitled
to a "trial in the ordinary way", in the District Court, he
must first present his claim to the Bureau and the Bureau
must first deny him compensation upon some ground going
to the basis of the claimant's right to share in the fund. And
in the District Court the parties are confined to the record
filed with the court as to the matter of evidence. It is worthy
of note here that although the court was confined to the
record, witnesses were heard in the District Court.'1
Apparently the only change made by the Administrative
Agencies Uniform Practice Act upon the method of judicial review of Workmen's Compensation Cases is that upon appeal to
the District Court the evidence is confined to the record filed
with the court.1 5 The appellant is still entitled to a trial de novo
in the Supreme Court.10
REVIEW OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CASES

One of the main issues argued in In Re Minneapolis, S. P.
& S. Ste. M. R. Co. 17 was whether or not the order as issued
by the Board of Railroad Commissioners was appealable. As
10 Laws of 1935 Chapter 286, Section 6
11 70 N. D. 165, 292 N. W. 627,- 128 A. L. R. 1482 (1940).
12 Laws of 1941 Chapter 240
13 73 N. D. 245, 13 N. W. 2d 610 (1943)
14 See testimony Schmidt v. Workman's Compensation Bureau, supra, pages
250-251
15 Schmidt v. Workman's Compensation Bureau, supra,; See Laws of 1941
Chapter 240, Section 19
ie Groff v. State, 72 N. D. 554, 9 N. W. 2d 406 (1943); Starkenberg v.
Workman's Compensation Bureau, 73 N. D. 234, 13 N. W. 2d 395 (1944)
17 30 N. D. 221, 152 N. W. 513 (1915)
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to the merits of the arguments pro and con we are not here
concerned. We are only concerned with the procedure on appeal., where appeal is allowed. In effect the court here held
that the Railroad Company could appeal to the District Court
and have a trial de novo there and if still aggrieved may appeal to the Supreme Court, which could relieve from the order
of the Commission. The Supreme Court goes further and
states, "The weight of the findings of the Board originally
made in the matter is a question different from the power of
the courts over the issue on which such findings are offered
as evidence. No doubt cases may arise where the findings of
the Commission... (citations here) ... may necessarily be of
an expert character, and because thereof, entitled to great
weight .... " From this it appears that ordinarily the findings
of the Commission are given little weight and the District
Court may, of its own accord, determine the issues. Justice
Bruce and District Judge Burr dissented in this case. Justice
Bruce points out that according to the majority view, the
District Court is given the power to make the administrative
decision which the Legislature has granted to the Commission by statute.
In Chapter 192 of the Session Laws of 1919, the Legislature
made provision for the Board of Railroad Commissioners to
regulate, control and fix rates, charges and services of all
public utilities. Sections 34, 35, and 42 of this Act provide
for judicial review of the Commission's orders. These sections
Were construed in State ex rel Hughes v. Milhollan.18 In speaking of judicial review of the Boards orders the court states:
"... we are of the opinion that the Legislature intended that
the orders of the Commissioners must be based upon evidence
submitted to them at the hearing or hearings; and that on
appeal the validity and lawfulness of the orders must be determined by the evidence contained in the record and certified to the court; and that in reviewing such orders the court
must exercise its own independent judgment upon such facts
and the law applicable thereto." The court goes on to say that
when an appeal is taken from the Board, the appeal will be
determined upon the evidence and the law, "... giving whatever weight to which they may be entitled, if any to the findings of the Commissioners upon disputed questions of fact... "
18

50 N. D. 184, 195 N. W. 292 (1923)
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It is apparent here that the court felt that upon an appeal to
the District Court the appellant would be entitled to an independent weighing of the evidence by the District Court. Sections 34, 35, and 42 of the Laws of 1919, Chapter 192 do not
state that the appellant is entitled to a trial de novo in the
'District Court, but apparently the review given by the court
goes that far.
The court points out in State v. Great Northern R. Co. 19 that
on an appeal to a District Court from the Board of Railroad
Commissioners the court is confined to the record. Reference
is made in this case to the fact that no witnesses were heard
by the court but that the decision of the court was based upon
a review of the testimony before the Board and certified to the
court. The Supreme Court also states that its decision is to
be based upon the same record.
The court also in this case refers to State ex rel Hughes v.
Milhollan, supra, and states, "While we exercise our own
independent judgment, this judgment must necessarily be
influenced to some extent by the judgment of the Board, in
a matter primarily before it and of which it has such special
facilities for judging of which we are denied."
A trial de novo is given one appealing from the Board of
Railroad Commissioners by Section 29 of Chapter 164 of Session Laws of 1933. The Supreme Court construed this section
in Re Tri State Motor Transp. Co. 20 The court states, "We are
of the opinion that that part of Section 29, Chapter 164 of the
Session Laws of 1933 which provides for a trial de novo on
demand, means a trial on appeal as in cases tried without a
jury, that is, upon all the evidence taken before the Commission upon which they made their findings." The court also
refers to Section 4609c35 of the 1925 Supplement to the Compiled Laws of 1913 and states that the District Court is confined to the record of the hearing before the Commission.
In construing Section 29 as to mean a "trial on appeal as
in cases tried without a jury" the Supreme Court infers that
upon appeal from the District Court after the trial de novo
the appellant may ask for a trial de novo in the Supreme
Court.21
19 56 N. D. 822, 219 N. W. 295 (1928)
20 67 N. D. 119, 270 N. W. 100 (1936)
21 Section 28-2732 Rev. Code 1943 which provides for a trial anew in the

Supreme Court upon an appeal of a case tried without a jury.
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Section 29, Chapter 164 of the Session Laws of 1933 did
not greatly enlarge judicial review of the Board's decisions
because prior to this enactment the review being given was
very extensive, so much so that the District Court had author22
ity to substitute its findings for those of the Board.
The Administrative Agencies Uniform Practices Act 23 became effective July 1, 1941. However the Act did not apply
to In Re Theel Brothers Rapid Transit Co. 2 4 because the Act
states that it is to become applicable in proceedings filed in or
by an agency subsequent to July 1, 1941.25 In this case the
proceeding was started before the Public Service Commission
in September 1940. Upon appeal to the District Court the appellants, who were protesting the application made before
the Commission, asked for a retrial of the cause and a review
of the order. This was granted and the District Court set aside
the Commission's order. An appeal was then taken to the Supreme Court and the appellant, who was the applicant in the
proceeding before the Commission, asked for a trial de novo.
It is interesting to note that our Supreme Court states that,
"The orders made by the Commission must be based upon
findings, and the findings must be based upon substantial evidence." The court does not state what they mean by substantial
evidence but they cite Lowden v. Ill. Com. Commission,6 wherein no clear cut definition of substantial evidence is given but it
is inferred that the evidence to be substantial must support
a conclusion that is reasonable. This inference was also apparent to our Supreme Court, because in the next paragraph
after the one quoted above; the court states, "The only question
for determination on appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order of the District Court, reversing the Public Utilities Commission is the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the
order is not unreasonable or arbitrary."
22 In support of this conclusion, see In Re Minneapolis, S. P. & S. Ste. M.
R. Co., supra, and to the cases previously referred to herein where the Supreme
Court has made these statments, ".... . and that in reviewing such orders the
court must exercise its own independent judgment upon such facts and the
law applicable thereto... " State ex rel Hughes v. Milhollan, supra; and "....
which requires the District Court to inquire into and determine the lawfulness
of the decision or the final order of the board..." State v. Great Northern R.
Co., supra.
23 Laws of 1941, Chapter 240
24 72 N. D. 280, 6 N. W. 2d 560 (1942)
25 Section 28-3222 Rev. Code 1943
26 376 I1. 225, 33 N. E. 2d 430, 39 PUR (NS)
482 (1941)
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References to substantial evidence appear again in In Re
Hanson.27 In this case the Commission made certain findings
to which the Supreme Court makes these references, "The
primary jurisdiction to determine administrative questions
of the character involved is with the Commission and if the
preponderance of the evidence supports the findings of the
Commission, courts do not substitute their judgment for that
of the Commission." The court here cited Theel v. Great
Northern R. Co., supra.29 Later in the case the court states
that the findings of the Commission cannot be said to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable when there is substantial
evidence from which to draw reasonably the inference of the
facts. Still later the court quotes a New York decision which
construes the expression "supported by the -evidence" to mean
that there must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence to
justify a finding upon which legal rights and obligations are
based.
The above two'cases show that our court today has a tendency to give greater weight to the findings of the Commission
if supported by substantial evidence, than was given when
In Re Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co., supra, and State
ex rel Hughes v. Milhollan, supra,were decided.
The case of In Re Northern Pacific Railroad Co.,2 9 brought
before the Supreme Court the following three sections of our
Code for judicial interpretation. Section 28-3219 which provides that the District Court upon an appeal from the determination of an Administrative Agency, is directed to reverse
or modify the decision of the agency if the court finds, among
other things, that "...the findings of fact made by the Agency
are not supported by the evidence." Section 28-3221 provides,
"The judgment of a District Court in an appeal from the
decision of an Administrative Agency may be reviewed in the
Supreme Court on appeal in the same manner as any case in
the court without a jury may be reviewed... " Section 28-2732
in to far as it is pertinent reads as follows, "On appeal in any
action tried by the court, without a jury, whether triable to a
jury or not.. The Supreme Court shall try anew the questions
of fact specified in the statement or in the entire case if appellant demands a retrial of the entire case... "
27
28
29

74 N. D. 224, 21 N. W. 2d 341 (1945)
Same case as In Re Theel. Bros. Rapid Transit, supra.
74 N. D. 416, 23 N. W. 2d 49 (1946)
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In construing these statutes together, our court states, "We
think it clear that these statutes, construed together, require
a trial de novo in the District Court upon the record, on an appeal from a determination of the Public Service Commission
and also a trial de novo upon an appeal from the District Court
to this court when as in this case, the statement of the entire
case and the specifications of error demand a review of the
entire case."
SUMMARY

Under the Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act
as construed in In Re Northern Pacific Railroad Co., supra,
a party appealing from the Administrative Agency has a
right to demand a trial de novo in the District Court and if
not satisfied with the judgment of that court, may appeal to
the Supreme Court and have a trial de novo there.
Prior to 1935, no trial de novo was given upon appeal from
the Workmen's Compensation Bureau. Nevertheless, whether
you called it a trial de novo or not, the appellant was entitled
to a trial in the ordinary way upon appeal to the District
Court and could appeal to the Supreme Court thereafter."s
In 1935 the Legislature provided for a trial de novo upon
appeal to the Supreme Court in Workmen's Compensation
31
cases.
Apparently the only change made by the new practice Act
in Workmen's Compensation cases was that upon appeal to the
District Court the parties are confined to the record filed with
the court as to the matter of evidence and thereafter upon
appeal to the Supreme Court the appellant may have a trial
de novo.3 2 In view of In Re Northern Pacific Railroad Co.,
supra, which construes the new Act, the appellant should
also be allowed a trial de novo in the District Court hereafter.
On appeals from the Board of Railway Commissioners, the
review given is also very broad. Even as far back as 1915 the
appellant was entitled to a trial de novo in the District Court
and also in the Supreme Court 3s This, of course, is still the
procedure under the new Act. The only change noted was that
in the more recent cases the Supreme Court seemed to give
30 Gotchy v. North Dakota Workman's Compensation Bureau, supra.
31 Laws of 1935 Chapter 285, Section 6
32 Schmidt v. Workman's Compensation Bureau, supra.
33 In Re Minneapolis St. P., S. Ste. M. R. Co., supra.
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some weight to the findings of fact of the Board if supported
by substantial evidence.3 4
A brief summary of the scope of review given by the federal
courts to the determinations of the Nation Labor Relations
Board 35 may serve as a basis for an evaluation of the doctrine
in force in this state governing judicial handling of administrative findings. As will appear later, the statutes of North
Dakota governing judicial review of administrative findings,
differ from the federal statutes concerning judicial review
of National Labor Relations Board findings. However, this
comparison is made for the purpose of pointing out to the
reader that there is a basic difference in the underlying theory
of the two systems. North Dakota does not give to the administrative agency the final voice on findings of fact in contrast
to the usual. situation in the federal system, wherein the. administrative agency's finding of fact is conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence.
Until the passage of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, supra, there was no federal law governing all the various
administrative agencies. Congress had, in setting up each
agency provided in the statute the methods for judicial review
of that agency's orders.3 The new Act in Section 10 provides
for a method of judicial review but does not supersede nor
repeal the methods already given to the various agencies by
the statute creating that agency. The new Act therefore did
not change the method and extent of review provided by the
National Relations Act, supra. In Olin Industries v. National
Labor Relations Board,3 7 the court points out that the legislative history of Section 10 of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, supra,shows that that section was to be merely
declaratory of the existing law ". . . and that it neither confers jurisdiction on this court above and beyond that which
it already has, nor grants to aggrieved parties any rights
that they did not have under the National Labor Relations
Act."
34

In Re Northern Pacific R. Co., supra.

35 29 U. S. C. A. Section 151-160

36 29 U. S. C.
of 1947
49 U. S. C.
26 U. S. C.
26 U. S. C.
37 72 F. Supp.

A. Section 160

(e)

(f),

Labor-Management

Relations

A. Section 16 (12) Interstate Commerce Commission
A. Section 1101 Tax Court of the United States
A. Section 1141 Tax Court of the United States
226, 1947

Act

220
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It will also be noted that Section 10 of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 3S was not substantially changed by the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.19 Therefore the
method and extent of review at the present time is substantially
the same as was given before the passage of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, supra, and the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947, supra.
Section 10 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, supra,
differs somewhat from our North Dakota review sections 283215, 28-3218, 28-3219. 4o However, neither the L.-M. R. A..nor
these North Dakota statutes provide for a trial de novo. Sections 10 (e) and (f) of the L.-M. R. A. expressly provide that
the Board's findings of fact are to be conclusive if supported
by "substantial evidence." Our North Dakota statutes do not
contain such a provision, but Section 28-3219 does provide that
the evidence considered by the court shall be confined to the
record filed with the court, and that the court shall affirm the
decision of the agency unless it shall find among other things,
"... that the findings of fact made by the agency are not
supported by the evidence..." Section 28-3221 of the North
Dakota Rev. Code of 1943 provides for the review in the
Supreme Court to be the same as is given in a case tried to
the court without a jury. This means a trial de novo, as Section 28-2732 so provides.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, supra, where there
is "substantial evidence" to support the findings made-by the
Board the court cannot put its decision in the place of the
decision of the Board. What the U. S. Supreme Court has
meant by substantial evidence is quoted above from the Consolidated Edison Case 41 as being, "... . such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might.accept as adequate to.support a
conclusion." It is apparent here, then, that the review given
by our North Dakota courts is much more extensive than that
given under the Nation Labor Relations Act, supra. In North
Dakota, the appellant is entitled to a trial anew, while under
the N. L. R. A., if there is "substantial evidence" to support
the findings of the Board, thensuch findings are conclusive.
In North Dakota under Section 28-2732 our Supreme Court,
S8 29 U. S. C. A. Section 160

39 29 U. S. C. A. Seition 160, as amended.
40 N. D. Rev. Code 1943
41 305 U. S. 197, 83 L. Ed. 126, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)
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"... . shall try anew the questions of fact specified..." Because of the Northern Pacific Railway Case, supra, the District Court also has the power to try anew the question of fact
specified in an administrative law case.
From this brief comparison of the Labor-Management Relations Act, supra, and our North Dakota statutes on judicial
review of administrative orders, it is apparent that North
Dakota does not give much weight to the agency's finding
of fact-an agency that is supposedly an expert in its field.
Our courts may take the evidence and weigh it independently.
Whether the federal procedure, as evidenced by the L.-M. R.
A. (or N. L. R. A.) decisions, or the North Dakota procedure,
is the better could only be determined by a complete investigation of the results produced under both. Such an investigation is not within the scope of this article. It is worthy of
note, however, that the U. S. Supreme Court has this to say
about judicial review of administrative decisions, "It is of
paramount importance that courts not encroach upon this
exclusive power of the Board if effect is to be given the intention of Congress to apply an orderly, informed, and specialized
procedure to the complex administrative problems arising in
the solution of industrial disputes. As it did in setting up
other administrative bodies, Congress has left questions of
law which arise before the Board-but not more-ultimately to
the traditional review of the judiciary. Not by accident, but
in line with a general policy, Congress has deemed it wise to
intrust the findings of facts to these specialized agencies2
It is essential that courts regard this division of responsibility
which Congress as a matter of policy has embodied in the very
statute from which the Court of Appeals derived its juris-

diction to act."

'4

JAMES E. LEAHY
THIRD YEAR LAW STUDENT
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA

42 Italics supplied by writer
43 Labor Board v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 206, 208, rehearing denied
in 309 U. S. 696, (1939)

